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      4 
EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION OF HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES 
After the analysis of the legal framework for European standardisation of services, this chapter 
will focus on European standardisation in the healthcare sector. In order to understand the 
potential of European standardisation of healthcare services to play a role in private law, the 
regulatory framework for healthcare services – both at the European and at the national level – 
has to be set out. The first part analyses the interaction between EU law and healthcare services. 
This will be done by looking at the impact of primary EU law, secondary EU law and European 
standardisation. The perspective then shifts to the national level to discuss what the role of 
private law is in the regulation of healthcare services, and to see what the potential impact of 
European standardisation could be. Finally, three case studies on European standardisation of 
services will be introduced. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the interaction between 
European standardisation and healthcare services. 
I. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EU LAW AND HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES 
 
A. The lack of EU competence to regulate healthcare services 
Healthcare is not one of the traditional competences of the EU. The healthcare systems of the 
various EU Member States are all very different in nature and are based on different cultural 
perceptions of how healthcare should be delivered and regulated. From a political point of view, 
it was considered undesirable for the EU to intervene in these national systems. The organisation 
of the healthcare systems was too closely linked to the national identity of the Member States, 
which strongly opposed any direct influence of the EU. Furthermore, healthcare services were 
traditionally local, in that patients would go to the general practitioner or hospital in their 
neighbourhood. Until relatively recently, the cross-border dimension which could possibly justify 
regulatory intervention by the EU was missing.  
Despite the absence of an express legal basis to regulate healthcare services, there are various 
areas of EU law which have had an impact on healthcare systems. For example, the Working 
Time Directive1 has had a profound impact on the organisation of healthcare at the national 
                                                          
1 Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time. 
level.2 As a result, stakeholders in the healthcare sector are well aware of the possible impact of 
EU regulation on the delivery of healthcare services. Furthermore, various aspects of EU 
regulation touch on (public) health issues. From the 1970s onwards, several measures had been 
adopted which could be considered to have improvement of public health as (one of) their main 
aims. The legal bases of these measures were uncertain or disputed.3 For that reason and for 
reasons of transparency, it was decided that the EU should be given a complementary 
competence in the field of public health. This competence was introduced by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. It provided that “the Community shall contribute towards a high level of human 
health protection by encouraging cooperation between Member States, and, if necessary, lending 
support to their action”.4 After the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is now expressly stated 
that the protection of a high level of human health is one of the areas in which the EU only has a 
complementary competence.5 Harmonisation of legislation is expressly excluded. Wolf Sauter has 
argued that this express recognition makes it clear that the EU intends to comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity and that it is recognised that this is an area of national competence.6 The 
complementary competence itself is now found in Article 168 TFEU. First of all, it provides that 
“a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation 
of all Union policies and activities”.7 As to the substance of the competence, the provision is 
now significantly more detailed than before. Article 168(1) provides that “Union action, which 
shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing 
physical and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental 
health”. This is then followed by some examples of possible action by the Union. In addition to 
this, Article 168(2) provides that the EU shall encourage cooperation between the Member 
States on these issues.  
 
From the late 1990s and early 2000s, various cases have reached the CJEU which dealt with the 
possibility of reimbursement for patients of the costs of healthcare services which they had 
received in another Member State.8 The impact of these cases will be discussed below. Most 
                                                          
2 Interview with UEMS and CPME (Warsaw) on 19 February 2013. 
3 T Hervey, ‘Community and National Competences in Health after Tobacco Advertising’ (2001) 38 CML Rev 1421, 
1422. 
4 Article 129 EC, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
5 Article 6(a) TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
6 W Sauter, ‘Harmonisation in healthcare: the EU patients’ rights Directive’ (2011)TILEC Research Paper 6, 3.  
7 Article 168(1) TFEU. 
8 In particular, see Case C-120/95,  Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés, ECLI:EU:C:1998:167; Case C-158/96, 
Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171; Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel and others v Alliance nationale des 
mutualités chrétiennes, ECLI:EU:C:2001:400; Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds and Peerbooms v Stichting 
CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen and van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270; Case C-
cases were brought on the basis of the right of service recipients to freely receive services in 
another Member State. The CJEU decided that healthcare services were not excluded from the 
scope of application of the right to free movement of services. Therefore, in theory, it became 
possible for the EU to adopt legislation on the basis of its internal market competence. 
However, the relationship between the internal market competence and the complementary 
competence in health was uncertain. The extent to which the internal market competence would 
provide an adequate and correct legal basis for harmonisation of healthcare services was 
debated.9 This debate was well illustrated by the opposition to the inclusion of healthcare 
services in the Services Directive.10 In the end, it was decided that healthcare services required a 
special solution. This solution came with the adoption of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 
in 2011.11 The adoption of the Directive was based both on Article 114 TFEU – the internal 
market competence – and Article 168 TFEU. The focus of this Directive is on the 
reimbursement of healthcare services which have been received outside a patient’s home 
Member State. As such, it remains very close to the CJEU’s case law and could be regarded as 
codification of its case law.12 However, the Directive goes further in that it also includes a 
number of information rights which are granted to patients who receive healthcare abroad. This 
means that the EU has chosen to complement the reimbursement rights with a number of 
traditional consumer rights. The cross-border patient is also considered to be a consumer. This is 
in line with the arguments of Gareth Davies, who has argued that it would be preferable to 
realise changes in national healthcare systems through granting individual private law rights to 
patients rather than through harmonising at the European level aspects of the delivery of 
healthcare services.13 Such a consumer-based approach would rely on the individual to challenge 
obstacles encountered in national healthcare systems and, through individual litigation, to bring 
about a more outward-looking perspective of national healthcare systems. 
 
Overall, the fact remains that the EU has not intervened in the standards or the quality of 
healthcare provided to patients at the national level. The Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 
provides that high-quality treatment shall be provided, but the meaning of high-quality is not 
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further defined in the Directive. There is also a reference to good quality healthcare in the 
Directive.14 It is difficult to interpret these standards as autonomous European standards, since it 
is expressly provided in the Directive that the standards of care remain national.15 This is 
important from the perspective of convergence. While Member States will be required to 
reimburse healthcare received in another Member State, they have to do so on the basis of the 
treatment which would have been provided in the home Member State.16 One could wonder to 
what extent such reimbursement leads to mutual recognition. This is an interesting question, 
perhaps more of theoretical than of practical importance, which has not been discussed in the 
literature. Member States have to compensate patients for treatment in another Member State, 
but only up to the level which the patient would have received if he had stayed at home. This 
arrangement does not imply any mutual recognition of the regulatory choices made by the other 
Member States – the national treatment remains the basis of compensation. It would have been 
different if the Member States had to reimburse the full rate of treatment – whatever the costs of 
the treatment in the other Member State. Furthermore, reimbursement does not necessarily 
imply that the regulatory standards are similar.  
The question then remains whether the EU would be able to harmonise standards of healthcare 
on the basis of its internal market competence. Derrick Wyatt has argued that the EU could 
circumvent the presumed lack of legal competence through the internal market competence.17 
This would allow the EU to adopt measures which could remove obstacles to free movement or 
distortions of competition. The various differences in the standards and quality of healthcare 
services in the 28 Member States could amount to an obstacle to the free movement of 
healthcare service recipients. Wyatt realistically accepts that “the proposition that lack of 
consumer confidence in the minimum guaranteed standards for the supply of goods and services 
in other Member States should be regarded in itself justifying harmonisation is one of which the 
present author is sceptical”.18 However, at the same time, he argues that “different standards of 
care resulting from disparities between national rules or administrative action in the various 
Member States could lead to distortion in the conditions of competition”.19 This argument 
appears to be quite formalistic from a legal point of view. Furthermore, it does not face up to the 
political reality that Member States do not want to limit their own sovereignty in the healthcare 
sector. Overall, it can be concluded that the EU internal market competence is unlikely to be 
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used to harmonise the standards of healthcare provided at the national level. The decision to 
argue that the internal market competence is sufficient to start harmonising the delivery of 
healthcare services is highly political and unlikely to be made in the near future. However, this 
does not mean that internal market law cannot have an indirect impact on the way in which 
national healthcare systems are regulated.  
B. The impact of the case law on free movement of services on the regulation of 
healthcare services 
 
From Kohl20 and Decker21, the CJEU has been forced to discuss a number of cases in which 
patients wanted to move across national borders to receive healthcare services. In general, the 
distinctive nature of these cases, which distinguished them from cases brought under the Social 
Security Regulation,22 was that the sole purpose of the cross-border movement was to receive 
healthcare services in another Member State. The CJEU included the right to receive healthcare 
services within the scope of the free movement of services, which is now found in Article 56 
TFEU.23 The CJEU’s case law has been extensively discussed elsewhere and it is not necessary to 
repeat these discussions in this section.24 However, from the specific perspective of convergence, 
it is interesting to note the extent to which the case law has had a convergent effect on the 
national regulation of healthcare services. Therefore, a number of areas will be discussed on 
which the CJEU’s case law has had a particular impact.  
(i) Procedural requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
On the basis of the case law it is, in principle, possible for Member States to impose a system 
of prior authorisation for patients who seek hospital treatment in another Member State, if 
the treatment requires hospitalisation.25 This could have an impact on private law, if patients 
have to obtain prior authorisation from the health insurer with which they hold their 
                                                          
20 Case C-158/96, Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171. 
21 Case C-120/95,  Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés, ECLI:EU:C:1998:167. 
22 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social 
security systems. 
23 Article 56 TFEU provides that restrictions to the right to provide services shall be restricted. This includes the 
right to receive services in another Member State: Joined Cases C-286/82 and C-26/83, Luisi and Carbone, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:35.  
24 For a recent discussion, see J Baquero-Cruz, ‘The Case Law of the European Court of Justice on the Mobility of 
Patients’ in F Benyon (ed), Services and the EU Citizen (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), 87-112. See also, in the same 
volume, R Cisotta, ‘Limits to Rights to Health Care and the Extent of Member States’ Discretion to Decide on the 
Parameters of Their Public Health Polices’, 113-163. 
25 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:404; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen and van 
Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen , ECLI:EU:C:2003:270. 
insurance policy. The exact definition of hospitalisation was never provided by the CJEU, 
but it was clear that prior authorisation of non-hospital care would never be permissible. 
Furthermore, the CJEU has made it clear that Member States must have transparent 
procedures for cases in which authorisation can be required. Decisions of the decision-
making body must be open to judicial review or some sort of quasi-judicial review 
proceedings, and they must be taken within a reasonable time-frame.26 
(ii) Substantive requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
As a result of the case law of the CJEU, the substantive criteria which Member States use in 
deciding whether or not to authorise treatment in another Member State have become more 
converged. The CJEU held in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms that the Dutch criterion of whether 
a treatment was “normal in the professional circles concerned” had to be interpreted from an 
international perspective – treatment sufficiently tried and tested by international science.27 
Relevant (international) scientific literature had to be taken into account. This means that 
Member States, in dealing with requests for prior authorisation, must look at treatments from 
an international point of view. They are not allowed to focus solely on national medical 
practice if this is unduly restrictive. The consequence is that the pallet of treatment options 
available to patients becomes broader and has to be interpreted from an international (and 
possibly European) perspective. This means that for out-going patients Member States are 
required to look at possible treatments in other Member States.  
Secondly, in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, the criterion that treatment abroad was a medical 
necessity - which in practice meant that the treatment could not be offered without undue 
delay in the home Member State – was justified as long as the decision-making body took all 
the specific circumstances of the case into account.28 Consequently, Member States are no 
longer justified in referring to the acceptable lengths of national waiting lists as an outright 
justification to refuse authorisation to receive healthcare abroad. They must always make an 
individual assessment based on the current and individual circumstances of the patient. 
The result of these substantive criteria for prior authorisation is that Member States are 
obliged to make an individual assessment of patients who would like to receive medical 
treatment abroad and that Member States are obliged to take international medical practice 
into account. This implies that Member States – at least at the level of prior authorisation – 
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can no longer close their eyes to medical practice in other Member States. It also applies to 
courts when they review decisions to refuse prior authorisation to patients who would like to 
receive healthcare services abroad. 
(iii) Waiting lists 
The individual assessment of the undue delay criterion (or medical necessity) has also had an 
impact on how Member States manage their waiting lists. It is no longer appropriate to 
refuse treatment abroad on the basis that the length of the waiting lists is acceptable. Each 
case requires an individual assessment of the circumstances of the patient.29 This has obliged 
Member States to introduce a certain flexibility in their management of waiting lists, and 
where necessary to pro-actively seek cross-border treatment options. Watts is a very clear 
example of the impact of EU free movement law on the management of waiting lists.30 The 
result of that case is that the UK’s National Health Service (“NHS”) now regularly sends 
patients to other Member States for treatment.31 
(iv) Transparency of costs of treatment 
Finally, the fact that non-hospital care has to be reimbursed and that prior authorisation can 
never be justified for those cases means that healthcare systems such as the NHS have to 
make the costs of the specific treatments transparent. Otherwise, it would be difficult or 
impossible to know to what extent treatment abroad will be reimbursed. The result is that 
Member States must make the costs of treatments accessible to patients. This is the case 
even if patients normally never see the prices of treatments, since they receive healthcare 
without having to pay for it.32 
Overall, the case law has mainly focussed on the proceduralisation of the right of patients to 
receive healthcare abroad. However, there is one procedural area which might result in 
substantive convergence. This is the result of the judgment in Geraets-Smits. Member States must 
take international science into account in deciding whether or not to grant prior authorisation. 
As a result, an obligation is imposed on Member States to analyse international scientific 
evidence that is available in a particular field and to assess to what extent the national healthcare 
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system is able to provide healthcare services in accordance with this international evidence.33 It is 
an implicit recognition that research in medicine has become significantly internationalised.34 
However, in practice, it has proved difficult for patients to base their claims on international 
scientific evidence, primarily because Member States retain a degree of discretion in deciding to 
what extent such international science is evidence-based.35  Nevertheless, the result of such an 
evaluation could be that a Member State has to reimburse treatment which is not available in the 
home Member State, but which could be brought in a broader category of treatments that are 
compensated by the home Member State. That is what happened in Elchinov.36 In effect, the 
CJEU imposed a duty of consistent interpretation on national courts – if it is at all possible to 
bring a foreign treatment within a category of treatments that are reimbursed in the home 
Member State, the national court should do so.37 Although no reference was made to 
fundamental rights, the aim of this approach is to provide substance to the right of patients to 
have access to healthcare.38 However, the danger is that it could encourage Member States to 
restrict the list of treatments at the national level by providing a very clear, but also very 
restrictive list with treatments available at the national level. This could become a particular 
problem for patients in the new Member States.39 If Member States were to adopt such an 
approach, this could be in breach of the requirement of high-quality or good quality healthcare 
which is imposed by the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011. In Stamatelaki,40 the CJEU 
held that private healthcare received in another Member State cannot simply be excluded from 
reimbursement on the basis of its private nature, when private healthcare is not reimbursed in 
the home Member State. As a consequence, Member States are required to look at the substance 
of the treatment – not the status of its provider. 
Finally, one can wonder to what extent the case law has had an impact on private law and on the 
possibility of convergence in private law. Here, it should be noted that this impact is very much 
dependent on how healthcare services are regulated at the national level. However, in general, 
the series of free movement cases has had a limited impact on private law relations. Because of 
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the focus on reimbursement and prior authorisation, the cases have intervened in the 
relationship between patient and the body which is responsible for reimbursing healthcare 
services. In most Member States, this is a public law relationship. In some Member States, such 
as the Netherlands, the case law has had an impact on the relationship between health insurer 
and patient, which would in principle be a private law relationship. However, health insurers 
operate in a regulatory framework which is strictly controlled and regulated by public law. 
Although the case law has an impact on the contractual relationship between insurer and patient, 
the content of the contract has to a significant extent been decided by public bodies. Despite this 
limited effect on the relationship between insurer and patient, it is clear that the case law has not 
had an impact on the private law relationship between doctor and patient – whether this 
relationship is considered to be contractual or in tort. All the cases have dealt with the rights of 
patients vis-à-vis the body that is responsible for paying for healthcare services. The case law 
under Article 56 TFEU has not had an effect on what patients can claim from their doctor. The 
next step is then to analyse to what extent the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 will go 
beyond the case law on the free movement of services. 
C. The impact of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 on the regulation of 
healthcare services 
It is generally agreed that the adoption of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive was primarily a 
codification exercise.41 The Directive codifies the CJEU’s case law on the free movement of 
patients. The articles on reimbursement of healthcare received in another Member State from the 
one in which the patient is affiliated to the healthcare system closely follow the rules laid down 
by the CJEU.42 The same is true for the rules on prior authorisation. The situations in which 
cross-border healthcare can be subject to prior authorisation are exhaustively listed.43 They 
include hospital treatment. However, an interesting difference – or clarification – with the case 
law is that the definition of hospital treatment which can be subject to prior authorisation is 
healthcare which involves overnight accommodation in hospital.44 As a consequence, it appears 
that out-patient treatment in hospital can no longer be subject to prior authorisation. 
In a number of areas, the Directive goes further than the case law. As such, it attempts to realise 
convergence of national healthcare regulation through harmonisation in a limited number of 
areas. The competence on which these harmonisation aspects are based is the same as that of the 
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overall Directive – the competence to regulate the internal market.45 It should be noted that the 
Directive was adopted in early 2011 and that the deadline for transposition in national law was 
25 October 2013. Therefore, the actual effect of the Directive in practice is still difficult to 
measure. However, it is clear there are significant differences in how and to what extent Member 
States have implemented the Directive.46 These difficulties can be explained by some of the new 
concepts introduced in the Directive and the need for Member States to adapt the requirements 
of the Directive to their national health systems. There are a number of areas where the 
Directive adds something to the case law of the CJEU.  
(i) Quality standards 
The Directive obliges Member States to provide cross-border healthcare in accordance with 
standards and guidelines laid down by the Member State of treatment.47 This does not 
directly encourage any convergence of standards, let alone the creation of European 
standards, but it does mean that Member States must have standards in place. Member States 
that have insufficient or no quality standards will be required to adopt such standards for the 
purpose of cross-border healthcare. If national standards are not available, Member States 
could decide to adopt international or European standards. It is unlikely that the effect of 
these standards would be limited to healthcare provided to patients coming from other 
Member States. Article 4(1) of the Directive also provides that Member States must take the 
principles of universality, access to good quality care, equity and solidarity into account in 
providing cross-border healthcare.48 This could mean that Member States are required to 
provide healthcare of a certain minimum quality level, and could even be required in certain 
circumstances to amend their quality standards to provide healthcare of a higher standard. 
(ii) Accessibility of quality standards 
In addition to having standards in place, these standards must also be accessible to patients 
from other Member States.49 Member States must establish information points which can 
provide patients in other Member States with relevant information on the standards and 
guidelines which are in place in the Member State of treatment.  
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(iii) Information requirements 
The Directive goes quite far in the information requirements that are imposed on healthcare 
providers. Article 4(2)(b) obliges healthcare providers to help patients to make an informed 
choice.50 This includes information on: 
(a) Treatment options 
(b) Availability of healthcare 
(c) Quality and safety of healthcare 
(d) Prices and invoices 
(e) Registration status and insurance of healthcare professionals 
These criteria all go some way towards providing a basis for informed consent. 
Consequently, the Directive protects patients who are considering cross-border healthcare by 
granting them a number of information rights. As such, the protection focusses on the 
service recipient – the patient in this case – and aims as much as possible to make the patient 
a well-informed consumer.51 In principle, these requirements are imposed on healthcare 
providers in the context of cross-border healthcare. However, the practical effect is that 
domestic patients will also receive this information. It is unlikely that Member States will 
create different information obligations depending on the origin of the patient. Such a 
distinction could realistically only be made in respect of language requirements. In this way, 
the Directive might also improve the provision of information to patients who remain within 
their home Member State.52 
(iv) Complaints and insurance 
Finally, the 2011 Directive obliges Member States to have transparent complaints 
mechanisms in place for patients.53 Furthermore, the Member State is required to have a 
system of professional liability insurance in place.54 
Unlike the case law of the CJEU, the Directive seems to have a direct impact on the patient-
doctor relationship. This would mainly be through the information requirements. However, it is 
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clear from the wording and the structure of the Directive that the obligations are imposed on the 
Member States, and not directly on healthcare providers. It seems very unlikely that the 
obligations in Article 4 would have direct effect in a dispute between a healthcare provider and a 
patient. Nevertheless, it is clear that by granting a number of consumer-like rights, the Cross-
Border Healthcare Directive has more of an impact on the private law aspects of the patient-
doctor relationship. However, its main focus is still procedural rather than substantive. This 
opens up the possibility for European standardisation to intervene directly in the patient-doctor 
relationship by regulating substantive aspects of the patient’s treatment. 
D. The role of European standardisation in the regulation of healthcare services  
On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that both the case law on the free movement of 
patients and the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive have realised some convergence in the 
regulation of healthcare services in the Member States. The Directive has codified the case law, 
but has also imposed a number of additional information obligations. This means that the 
standards of care become more accessible and transparent. However, because of the EU’s lack of 
legal competence to regulate quality of healthcare directly, both the case law and the Directive 
are still based on the presumption that the standards for healthcare services are defined at the 
national level. They do not directly interfere with the national definition of quality of care. 
Member States are merely encouraged to exchange national standards. 
In a European internal market for healthcare services, such an exchange could eventually result 
in a need for a European definition of quality of care. This could be in areas in which there is a 
significant amount of cross-border movement of patients, or in areas in which the regulation of 
(private) healthcare services is very different in the various Member States. Member States are 
allowed under certain conditions to refuse prior authorisation of healthcare abroad.55 One of 
them is Article 8(6)(c) of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive, which provides that concerns 
about the quality of the healthcare providers are one of the legitimate reasons to refuse prior 
authorisation.56 Again, therefore, there is an incentive in the Directive for quality to be regulated 
at the European level.  
In this broader framework, standardisation would then become one of the options to regulate 
quality of care issues at the European level. European standardisation would intervene directly in 
the patient-doctor relationship by regulating aspects of the treatment. The standards in a 
European standard could be used directly in contractual disputes between healthcare providers 
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and patients, or as a benchmark to determine the standard of care in contract or tort cases. A 
European standard would provide substantive rights as a supplement to the procedural rights 
provided in the Directive. 
The next step is to see in which areas European standardisation processes have been started and 
what the underlying reasons for these processes were. However, before this can be done, it is 
necessary to describe in more detail how healthcare services are regulated at the national level, 
how public law and private law interact in the regulation of healthcare services and how 
European standardisation would fit in the national regulatory frameworks for healthcare services.  
II. THE REGULATION OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LAW 
 
A. The transformation of the character of healthcare services 
This section will outline two developments that have taken place in the healthcare sector in the 
last few decades. The first has been on the macro level and has affected the way in which 
Member States have organised the delivery of healthcare services at the national level. The 
second development, which has partly been caused by the first development, has taken place at 
the level of the relationship between doctor and patient. 
Traditionally, healthcare services have been strictly public and have been organised exclusively by 
the State. It was considered to be the ultimate responsibility of the State to ensure that its citizens 
would receive proper healthcare. This position has not really changed, but what we can see in the 
last decades is that Member States have introduced elements of competition and privatisation in 
their healthcare systems.57 The result is that the public law character of the healthcare sector has 
diminished. One of the contributing factors to this development has been the project of the EU 
to liberalise services of public interest. Although this project has not had a direct impact on 
healthcare, it is clear that it has encouraged Member States to transform the healthcare sector in 
such a way that it also incorporates elements of competition.58 This creation of a market for 
healthcare services also means that several provisions of EU law – such as competition law and 
free movement law – become applicable to the healthcare sector. The extent to which these 
market elements have been introduced differs among the Member States. What they have in 
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common in a significant number of Member States is that the bodies which – under public 
legislation – have been given responsibility to ensure the provision of healthcare services to their 
citizens or customers have to encourage competition among healthcare providers. They have a 
choice where to buy healthcare services, which means that healthcare providers have to compete 
for patients. The tool which is commonly used is a private law tool – contracts are concluded 
between healthcare “buyers” and healthcare providers. This has introduced market dynamics in 
the healthcare sector, in that healthcare providers become more focussed on profit-making.59 
Furthermore, public and private healthcare providers will more frequently compete for the 
provision of healthcare services. It is no longer guaranteed that contracts will go to public 
hospitals. As such, private healthcare has been given a more significant role in the healthcare 
system. The scope of private healthcare providers has been broadened. In addition to this, it has 
become more common for patients to seek private healthcare. The existence of private 
healthcare providers who provide supplementary services in addition to the public healthcare 
system means that patient choice is enhanced. Furthermore, for private healthcare which has 
been sought outside the public healthcare system, the relationship between patient and 
healthcare provider is contractual. Again, this means that private law will have more of an impact 
on the regulation of healthcare services. Moreover, the significant increase of private healthcare 
providers means that it is necessary for supervisory agencies to expand their work to the private 
sector. Often, it is difficult for them to get a full picture of what is going on in the private 
sector.60 In general, both the limited liberalisation and privatisation have had an impact on the 
regulation of healthcare regulation and have created more of a role for private law, or quasi-
private law, in the regulation of healthcare services. 
The liberalisation and privatisation of healthcare services have not just had an impact on how the 
healthcare sector is organised. They have also had an impact on the relationship between doctor 
and patient. Just like the bodies that are responsible for buying healthcare services have been 
given more choice, patients have also been given more choice – even within the public 
healthcare systems of the Member States. Historically, patients go to local hospitals to see a 
doctor. Healthcare has a strong territorial element. This is not surprising – patients do not want 
to travel long distances for medical care, they like to build up a relationship with their doctor and 
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they prefer to have quick access to medical care. This local, territorial element of healthcare has 
not disappeared. However, the various developments in the healthcare sector have resulted in a 
new “type” of patient. This process could be described as the “consumerisation” of the patient.61 
The consumerisation of patients means that patients are becoming more and more like 
consumers. This implies an element of choice, and an element of “shopping for healthcare”. 
This choice is granted by the co-existence of public and private healthcare providers and, as has 
already been said, by the possibility of choice within the public healthcare system. It can no 
longer be assumed that patients will go to the hospital next door – if there is a hospital a few 
hours away that offers specialist care of a higher quality, they will often opt for that hospital. 
This means that healthcare services are, to a certain extent, being removed from their territorial 
basis. Furthermore, patients have more access to information about the contents, the risks and 
the consequences of medical treatment. The number of internet fora and patient websites with 
medical information has increased enormously in the last couple of years – sometimes to the 
detriment of the accuracy of the information. The result of the increase in information is that 
patients have become more demanding towards doctors and will not hesitate to ask for a second 
opinion if they are not pleased with the diagnosis or proposal for treatment. Again, this could 
mean that patients will travel some distance to obtain a second opinion. Cross-border healthcare 
becomes a more realistic option. This consumerisation of the patient is also reflected in the 
Cross-Border Healthcare Directive itself. In addition to the right to reimbursement of cross-
border healthcare, the focus of the Directive is very much on ensuring that patients are provided 
with adequate information.62   
B. The interaction between public law and private law in the regulation of 
healthcare services at the national level 
Because of its public nature, it is not surprising that healthcare is heavily regulated by public law 
at the national level. This section is not intended to provide a detailed overview of the legal 
regulation of healthcare services and providers at the national level. It will not engage in a 
detailed discussion of national systems. Rather, it will sketch out the landscape of public law and 
private law interaction in the healthcare sector in general. Inevitably, this means that certain 
generalisations are made about national healthcare systems, which are usually highly specific. The 
same applies to the legal regulation of national healthcare systems. However, this abstract picture 
of the landscape will provide an idea of the issues that are relevant to the ability of European 
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standardisation to have an impact on the healthcare sector at the national level. The focus is on 
the interaction between public law and private law in the regulation of healthcare services and 
providers. Moreover, a distinction will be made between ex ante and ex post regulation. 
Healthcare services would not be provided without medical professionals. Medical professionals 
need certain qualifications before they are allowed to practise medicine. The training 
requirements for doctors – as well as a number of other medical professionals – have been 
harmonised at the European level.63 This has enabled the EU to adopt the Professional 
Qualifications Directive,64 which provides that doctors who are qualified in one Member State 
should be allowed to offer their services in another Member States and should be admitted to 
the profession if they want to practise in another Member State on a permanent basis. It should 
be noted that this harmonisation has primarily been of a quantitative nature – recognition is 
based on the number of years of training. This is clear from the Directive itself.65 The 
quantitative aspect of the harmonisation is supplemented with a more qualitative description of 
the substance of the training of medical practitioners. For medical specialists, the Union 
Européenne de Médicins Spécialists (“UEMS”) is responsible for making the syllabi which 
contain the requirements for training for medical specialists.66 This involves the bringing together 
of medical specialists of all Member States to decide on the required standards. As such, UEMS 
is essentially engaged in a form of standardisation. All of this takes place at the European level. 
At the national level, access to the medical profession is mainly regulated through public or 
administrative law. The bodies which are responsible for the registration might be of a quasi-
public nature, but there is little direct involvement of private law.  
The same applies to healthcare providers. Institutions that wish to provide healthcare services 
usually have to obtain some sort of license. Again, this is a public law requirement. The 
requirements that have to be fulfilled before licenses are awarded are laid down in legislation. 
Most Member States have supervisory agencies that monitor whether healthcare providers are 
complying with these requirements. In case of non-compliance, the agencies have powers under 
public law to (temporarily) close institutions or to order them to restrict their activities. The same 
applies to medical practitioners, who are also supervised and can be required to stop working in 
case of non-compliance. Whether the healthcare system is based on insurance or on universal 
provision of healthcare to all citizens, agreements will have to be made between the healthcare 
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buyers and healthcare providers. In that respect, private law plays a role since, depending on the 
nature of the healthcare system, these agreements can be of a contractual nature. This is perhaps 
the sole example of private law fulfilling a ex ante regulatory function. In the agreement, it can be 
agreed under what conditions healthcare services are delivered and with what standards they 
have to comply. However, the extent to which these agreements actually regulate standards and 
quality of care is unclear.67  
When the doctor and patient meet, in the public healthcare system, they establish a relationship 
which is essentially of a private law character. In some Member States, this relationship creates 
both a contractual relationship and a relationship in tort, while in other Member States the 
private law character is solely expressed through the imposition of a duty of care in tort. 
However, in practice, this does not make a great difference, as the standard of care is usually 
similar in contract and in tort. Obviously, in private healthcare, the relationship between doctor 
and patient is contractual. The contract is then usually concluded with the clinic in which the 
treatment is provided. This also means that the substance of the contract, which has to be 
expressly concluded, becomes more important. Despite the private law character of the 
relationship between doctor and patient, public law still imposes certain duties on medical 
practitioners. These duties will often evolve around a duty to provide reasonable care – which is 
not too different from the duty imposed in contract or tort.  
In general, it could be said that public law is mostly concerned with ex ante regulation of 
healthcare services. Private law, on the other hand, becomes relevant when something has gone 
wrong in the relationship between doctor and patient. The patient can then sue the doctor or 
healthcare provider in contract or in tort. Similarly, disciplinary law – which is difficult to place 
on the public law-private law spectrum – can also intervene ex post. While disciplinary 
proceedings are often started with a complaint from a patient, the character of the proceedings is 
less private in that the reputation of the medical profession as a whole is taken into account. 
Moreover, disciplinary proceedings are usually heavily regulated by public law. Certain Member 
States, such as Germany, have out-of-court dispute settlement procedures where liability disputes 
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between medical practitioners and patients can be resolved without having to go through the 
court systems.68 
What both public law and private law have in common in the healthcare sector is that they 
usually impose very broad and general obligations and duties on medical professionals and 
healthcare providers. These duties subsequently have to be defined more precisely. This 
specification of the duty of care of medical professionals – whether in public law or in private 
law – can be done ex post through judicial or disciplinary proceedings. A court will then be 
required to define the required standard of care. Alternatively, the required standard of care can 
be defined ex ante through some sort of standardisation. The healthcare sector is full of 
guidelines, standards and protocols. Some of these standards have been adopted at the 
international level, while others will be national. It is clear that, especially for scientific standards, 
there has been a process of internationalisation, which has frequently been encouraged by the 
United States.69 This has also been recognised in the case law of the CJEU discussed above.70 In 
many cases, the parties who are making medical standards draw from the same international 
scientific evidence. However, there is still a broad margin of appreciation in the interpretation of 
this evidence which can result in the adoption of different standards at the national level.71 Such 
standards can apply to hospitals or to individual medical specialists. They will have a different 
status in medical practice, but in general they are not directly binding in law. They are used to 
define and specify the requirements imposed on healthcare service providers in public as well as 
private law.  
C. European standardisation in national regulation of healthcare services 
The link from national healthcare standardisation to European standardisation through CEN is 
then easily made. European standardisation could be one way of specifying the required duty of 
care of medical professionals in public or private law. However, this is where some caution is 
required. The way in which the Member States have organised medical standardisation differs 
significantly. Because of a lack of expertise of the public administration, it is understandable that 
medical professionals have to be closely involved in the standardisation process. However, the 
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extent to which they are autonomous in the standard-setting process depends on the Member 
State in question. In some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, medical standardisation 
is strictly controlled by the State.72 Although it will always be doctors who define the standards, 
they are brought to work in a standardisation framework which is strictly publicly supervised. 
This means that such standardisation is not really private regulation, but more co-regulation 
under public supervision. The intention behind this is that self-regulation cannot exclusively be 
relied on to produce outcomes which are beneficial to the public good.73 There has to be public 
accountability and control.74 Therefore, the State is in control of the organisation of the process 
and of the incorporation and application of the standards in the healthcare sector. Public 
supervisory agencies act on the basis of these standards, or even on the basis of standards which 
they have made themselves.75 This public responsibility for medical standardisation cannot be 
seen in all Member States. For example, in the Netherlands, much more reliance is placed on the 
medical profession itself, without too much supervision or hierarchy. It is strongly believed that 
the medical profession itself should be responsible for the making of standards in the healthcare 
sector.76 Public supervisory agencies will rely on these standards in their supervisory activities, 
but they exercise no influence on the making of them. As a consequence, the Dutch system 
clearly recognises the autonomy of the medical profession in deciding when, how and which 
standards have to be set. However, it has also become clear that the profession itself cannot be 
entirely relied on to make sufficient and adequate medical standards. Therefore, the Netherlands 
has now introduced a Quality Institute for Healthcare.77 This institute will not get involved in the 
actual standard-making process, but it will set out how medical standards should be made and it 
will provide a public stamp of approval to standards that have complied with their requirements. 
Moreover, the institute has been granted the power to force the medical profession to start 
working on a standard if it considers it necessary that a standard be developed.78 As such, the 
institute could issue a “top-down” mandate to the profession, which would be a similar to 
Commission mandates in the New Approach. However, the institute would not get involved in 
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the actual substance for the standard – this would remain within the control of the medical 
profession.79 If the Dutch system is compared with the UK system, it is clear that there is a 
difference in professional autonomy in the two countries. In the UK, the standardisation process 
is tightly controlled and supervised by public authorities, which are also involved in the 
standardisation process. As a result, the medical standards that are developed will take more 
interests into account than just the purely medical scientific issues. This is not necessarily the 
case in the Netherlands, where medical standardisation remains primarily a scientific evidence-
based exercise. The subsequent policy questions which have an inevitable impact on medical 
practice are not directly dealt with in the standardisation process. 
Overall, the lesson which should be learnt from the national systems is that there are significant 
differences in the extent to which Member States allow private regulation to play a role in the 
regulation of healthcare services. This is not the same as the scope of private law – private law 
will always have a role to play through contract and tort law. However, certain Member States 
have created very public structures of medical standardisation. This might mean that European 
standardisation of healthcare services, which essentially remains private regulation, might not 
easily be accepted in these Member States. As a result, one has to look at the scope of private 
regulation at the national level. If the scope of private regulation is limited, this could result in 
Member States objecting to European standardisation. This would be likely to have an impact on 
whether or not they approve European standardisation projects. Consequently, it would be more 
likely to have an impact on the making of European standards than on their application. 
However, this would also depend on the question to what extent public authorities get involved 
in (blocking) European standardisation initiatives in the healthcare sector. This is something that 
will be discussed in the next section.  
III. THREE CASE STUDIES ON EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION 
OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
 
A. Aesthetic Surgery Services 
In April 2010, a European standardisation process for Aesthetic Surgery Services was started 
through CEN. The initiative had been submitted by a number of Austrian plastic surgeons to the 
Austrian Standards Institute (“ASI”), which was also to act as secretariat to the standardisation 
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process.80 Two key reasons for the standardisation project can be identified. First of all, aesthetic 
surgery has become a highly profitable market. This is also clear from the PIP breast implants 
case, which will be discussed below. Aesthetic surgery is usually provided by private healthcare 
providers outside the public healthcare system. There is a significant amount of advertisement; 
treatments are voluntary and easy to obtain. This means that the patient is not really a patient but 
more of a consumer.81 This consumer is prepared to travel across borders for treatment. As a 
result, it is possible to say that aesthetic surgery takes place in a market, which is somewhat 
removed from the traditional public healthcare systems. Furthermore, the market is truly 
European, or even international. Secondly, the medical professionals which operate on this 
market have very different qualifications. Various medical specialties perform treatments which 
could be described as aesthetic surgery. Plastic surgeons are the main specialty that has entered 
the aesthetic surgery market, but dermatologists, ENT-surgeons and even general practitioners 
also operate on the market.82 Moreover, it is possible for doctors with basic training to be 
involved in aesthetic surgery. In some Member States it is even possible for nurses to perform 
aesthetic surgery.83 As a consequence, the market is full of different service providers. Some do 
not have a fixed location and travel from one Member State to another with their products and 
materials.84 Some of them have decided to call themselves cosmetic surgeons, which in many 
Member States is not a protected title.85 This could create confusion for patients, as the use of 
the term surgeon would imply specialist training as a surgeon. This is just one example of a lack 
of regulation of aesthetic surgery services at the national level. The only Member State which has 
a very clear regulatory framework is France, in which it is provided by law that all aesthetic 
surgery treatments have to be performed under the supervision of a plastic surgeon.86 In 
Denmark, medical professionals who want to get involved in aesthetic surgery first have to 
receive certification.87 Following the PIP breast implants scandal, the cosmetic surgery sector has 
come under the attention of national regulatory agencies which, in cooperation with the EU, are 
working to fill regulatory gaps and to tighten the regulation of the aesthetic surgery sector.88 The 
European standardisation process also seeks to play a role in this regulatory framework. 
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However, one could wonder to what extent the European standardisation initiative has already 
been overtaken by legislative initiatives at the national level, such as in the UK.89  
 
Although the standardisation process covers the complete doctor-patient relationship – 
including, for example, issues as consent – its main focus is twofold. First, the European 
standard intends to regulate which medical professionals can perform which treatments. It 
introduces a number of competences medical professionals must have obtained before they can 
perform certain treatments.90 The standard has a list with treatments, which have all been given a 
certain risk factor. Treatments with a higher risk factor can only be performed by medical 
professionals with more advanced training and experience. Second, the standard sets out what 
facilities a medical professional must have before certain treatments can be performed.91 A 
distinction is made between treatments that can be performed in a treatment room and 
treatments that require an operating theatre. As such, the standard would prevent doctors from 
treating consumers at their home. Treatment would have to be provided at a location with a 
certain minimum of facilities. Overall, the focus of the European standard is on the “by whom” 
and “where” of aesthetic surgery services. The standard does not directly deal with the “how” of 
aesthetic surgery.92 As a result, those who are involved in the standardisation process seek to 
distinguish this standard from evidence-based medical standards, which would set out how 
specific treatments have to be performed on the basis of scientific evidence.93 According to 
them, a distinction should be made between standardising the medical procedure and the 
medical process.94 This standard only deals with the process. This does not mean that the 
standard should not be based on sound medical evidence – however, it is different in nature 
from evidence-based medical standards. Those who oppose European standardisation argue that 
the very inclusion of certain aesthetic surgery treatments in the standard already requires 
scientific evidence and that the standard might appear to justify certain treatments for which 
there is no legitimate basis in scientific evidence.95 
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Twenty-two Member States are involved in the standardisation process.96 They all have created 
national mirror committees to be able to represent the national positions at the European level. 
In addition, a number of international and European organisations are participating with liaison 
status. This means they participate in the meetings, but they have no active voting rights. Certain 
sections of UEMS – committees representing a particular medical specialty – also participated in 
the meetings. However, they did so without the explicit support of UEMS and, after the draft 
standard had been published in May 2012, it became clear that UEMS would withdraw any 
(implicit) support of the standardisation process.97 It also asked CEN to refrain from referring to 
UEMS syllabi or other documents in the European standard.98 This was the first public 
opposition to the standard. However, there had already been significant tensions in the 
standardisation process. They were mainly caused by the different positions of the stakeholders 
in the various Member States – both of the medical profession and the various public bodies 
involved in the supervision of the healthcare sector. These positions were highly dependent on 
the national regulatory frameworks. Because France already has legislation in place that provides 
that only plastic surgeons can provide aesthetic surgery services, the French position in the 
standardisation process has been to protect the French legislation.99 This has primarily been done 
by ensuring a significant amount of a-deviations, which clarify which aspects of the European 
standard might not comply with the French legislation.100 This is a fundamentally different 
position from ensuring that aesthetic surgery services are adequately regulated by creating a good 
quality standard. A similar position has been taken by Denmark and Germany.101 The UK, the 
Netherlands and Austria have been the main supporters of the standard and have provided most 
of its input.102 
 
A draft standard was published in early 2012.103 After the various comments had been received, it 
became clear in September 2012 that the standard would not have sufficient support – the 
required 71% of the votes – to be adopted.104 A period of reflection was started. It was decided 
to make a clearer distinction between aesthetic surgery services and non-surgical aesthetic 
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services. A new draft standard was published in December 2012,105 which required a new CEN 
enquiry which took place until May 2013. The new comments were resolved in September 2013. 
However, it was not until October 2014 when the final vote took place. The standard was 
formally adopted in December 2014 and is now available through the national standardisation 
organisations. 
 
From the start European medical associations have been vehemently opposed to the 
standardisation process. Their opposition is based on, on the one hand, criticism of the 
suitability of European standardisation through CEN as a regulatory tool in the healthcare sector 
and, on the other hand, on specific concerns about the standardisation process for aesthetic 
surgery services.106 In early 2011, the President of the Comité Permanent de Médicins Européens 
(“CPME”) visited CEN to express the strong view of his organisation that CEN should not 
enter the healthcare sector.107 He considered it undesirable for CEN to enter a field which should 
remain in control of the medical profession. In September 2012, a common position was 
adopted by a number of European medical associations which rejected the possibility of 
standardisation through CEN in the healthcare sector.108 The concerns were threefold.109 Firstly, 
the standardisation process of CEN was fundamentally incompatible with traditional methods of 
medical standardisation based on scientific evidence. It would open up the possibility of non-
medical concerns having an impact on the standardisation process, which would not result in 
optimum medical care. Such standardisation would endanger the autonomy of the medical 
profession. Secondly, it would not be compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. Thirdly, it 
would be in breach of the explicit rejection of EU competence to regulate healthcare services in 
Article 168 TFEU. The latter two objections do not appear to be legally correct, as they are 
based on a misunderstanding of CEN’s role at the European level and the legal status of 
standardisation. However, the medical associations argued that there is a strong top-down 
element to the standardisation process and that it would be likely that the European standard 
would be made legally binding in one way or another. 
 
These general concerns were supplemented by specific concerns about the standardisation 
process for Aesthetic Surgery Services. The first concern was that the standardisation process 
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had insufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the standards that would be set would be 
based on sound scientific evidence.110 The European standardisation process could be abused to 
provide a sense of medical legitimacy to aesthetic surgery treatments that were not in fact 
evidence-based.111 Furthermore, the standardisation process and its revision process were too 
slow to ensure that the standard would always be based on up-to-date medical evidence. The 
second concern was that the standardisation process would be used to establish aesthetic surgery 
as a separate medical specialty.112 This had previously been tried through UEMS, but UEMS had 
resisted and refused to recognise aesthetic surgery as a separate specialty.113 The result of this 
could be that European standardisation would now be used to achieve the same result and 
essentially to engage in some sort of market protection and restriction of the market by reserving 
treatments to this new quasi-specialty. It would provide a route to a small group of medical 
doctors to restrict the aesthetic surgery market to a limited group of doctors.114  
 
B. Cleft Lip Surgery Services 
 
In December 2010, BDS, the Bulgarian standardisation organisation, submitted a proposal to 
CEN for a European standard on Cleft Lip Surgery.115 The initiative was submitted to BDS by 
the European Cleft Organisation (“ECO”), a European patient organisation which seeks to 
promote high-quality medical care for babies born with cleft lips throughout Europe. It had 
specifically chosen BDS as the standardisation organisation to administer the process, since this 
would help to raise awareness for the standardisation process in the new Member States.116 
ECO is a European organisation for cleft patients throughout Europe. The organisation is run 
by a group of cleft patients and medical doctors. Its main aim is to ensure that there are 
minimum standards for cleft lip treatment in all EU Member States. It recognises that standards 
of care are widely divergent in the EU, but it argues that all EU citizens should be entitled to a 
minimum level of care.117 Its position is that this minimum level of care is not provided in all EU 
Member States.118 It is dissatisfied with the quality of care provided in certain Member States, in 
particular Bulgaria and Romania. To remedy this, ECO is involved in the training of medical 
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specialists and nursing personnel in a number of new Member States.119 It has developed and 
coordinated training programmes. There are very few standards on cleft lip treatment in these 
Member States and the level of research is much less advanced than in some of the older 
Member States. For these reasons, ECO believed that it would be good to have a European 
standard that would set out the minimum level of care required for patients with cleft lips.120 
Cross-border movement of patients is not a realistic possibility for babies born with clefts. 
Because of a lack of financial resources, patients in the new Members are not able to travel to the 
old Member States for treatment.121 In addition, babies born with clefts need a series of 
treatments, which would make cross-border movement for treatment difficult – if not 
impossible. For that reason, the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 is not of much practical 
help. A European standard could help to raise the overall level of care throughout the EU. 
Furthermore, it would empower patients to require a certain level of care from the doctors in 
their home Member State. 
The aims of the standardisation initiative were clearly put in the proposal submitted to CEN in 
December 2010: 
“The benefits of standardisation in this field will be the establishment of a clear and accurate specification of the 
healthcare management process for infants born with clefts. A European Standard will help to reduce the health 
inequalities in the EU countries and support patients’ safety”122 
For some time, ECO had thought about which route could best be taken to develop such a 
standard. As a patient organisation, it was in a more difficult position than associations of 
medical doctors, which have traditionally been involved in the making of their own evidence-
based standards for medical treatment. The route a patient organisation had to take if it wanted 
to initiate a standard on cleft lip treatment was not immediately clear. One of the members of 
ECO’s board was a surgeon in the United Kingdom who had previously been involved in the 
creation of standards for medical devices through CEN.123 As a result, the attention of ECO was 
drawn to CEN. In the end, ECO decided that a standardisation process through CEN would be 
a suitable means to achieve its aim of realising a minimum level of care in all EU Member 
States.124 
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ECO was very much aware that this was an experimental process, but for three reasons it 
considered a standardisation process through CEN to be particularly worthwhile. Firstly, the 
standardisation process would bring together at the European level various stakeholders 
involved in cleft care. The standard would derive a sense of authority from this consensus-based 
process.125 At the time of the initiative there were too many standards throughout Europe, none 
of which had particular authority over other standards. CEN would provide a mechanism to 
develop a standard that would potentially be authoritative in all Member States. Secondly, the 
standard would help to create a degree of consistency. Although ECO would never claim that 
there should be one uniform treatment process provided to all cleft patients in the EU, there 
should at least be consensus about the minimum level of care which has to be provided to all 
patients.126 Thirdly, and finally, ECO recognised that a CEN standard would not override 
national legislation. As such, the fact that national legislation would be very different in the 
various Member States would not cause any direct difficulties.127  
The care of babies born with cleft lips is not a market. Unlike aesthetic surgery, cleft lip care is 
still very much provided by public hospitals as part of public healthcare systems. Therefore, it 
could be expected that cleft care can more easily be exclusively regulated by the medical 
profession through traditional methods of medical standardisation based on scientific medical 
evidence. However, it is apparent from this initiative that, from the perspective of a European 
patient organisation, there are significant differences in knowledge and expertise within the 
Member States. The proposal for a European standard involved the linking of national structures 
of medical standardisation through opening up national medical standardisation to a European 
market. CEN would be used as a catalyst for this process. 
After the submission of the proposal to CEN, the national standardisation organisations had to 
consult with their stakeholders. These meetings took place in early 2011 and in April 2011 all 
national standardisation organisations voted on the proposal.128 Five Member States voted 
against the proposal, while fifteen Member States voted in favour. Eleven Member States 
abstained. Because of CEN’s weighted voting procedures the proposal was rejected. The 
Member States that voted against the proposal were Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Spain.129 Broadly speaking, three categories of objections can be identified: (i) healthcare 
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services provided in public healthcare systems should be regulated by the State without 
interference of private regulation; (ii) European standards would lower the level of care provided 
in some of the old Member States; (iii) European standardisation would not be the right 
mechanism to create standards for healthcare services. 
After the negative vote, ECO organised a number of meetings in France and Spain to increase 
the support for a European standardisation process in late 2011 and early 2012.130 In May 2012 it 
became clear that, after some additional meetings with national stakeholders, there would still 
not be sufficient support to start a European standardisation process.131 ECO then considered 
the possibility of creating a Workshop Agreement through CEN. This would not have the same 
status as a European standard, but could potentially be a first step towards a European standard. 
However, even the possibility of a Workshop Agreement was (informally) rejected by a number 
of standardisation organisations.132 As an alternative, ECO decided to develop a Technical 
Report through CEN, using ASI as the secretariat.133 The first meeting was held in Vienna in 
September 2013. A Technical Report does not have the same status as a European standard – it 
is even softer than a European standard –, but it can still be used to lay down standards for 
services. In May 2015, the Technical Report was finally adopted.134 
C. PIP breast implants135 
The third case study in this chapter is the PIP breast implants scandal. It is not directly 
concerned with European standardisation of healthcare services. Breast implants are considered 
medical devices and come within the scope of the New Approach. However, because they are 
closely linked to aesthetic surgery services and form an important part of the next chapters, an 
introduction to the role of European standardisation in the PIP breast implants scandal will be 
provided in this chapter. 
In the last decades, breast implants have become a very popular product for women throughout 
the world. The PIP factory, located in France, was one of the main producers of breast implants 
in Europe, and possibly even in the world. It started producing breast implants in the early 
1990s. At some point in the early 2000s, PIP started having financial difficulties and decided to 
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develop an ingenious strategy to cut costs. Instead of filling the breast implants with the required 
medical silicone gel, PIP started to use industrial sub-standard industrial silicone gel in the 
production process. This was obviously significantly cheaper. Unfortunately, it is still unclear 
how systematic the use of sub-standard industrial silicone gel was – it seems that certain badges 
of PIP implants contained only the required medical gel, while others contained a mix or only 
industrial gel. The randomness of the production process has made it much more difficult to 
identify risks and has led to significant delay in taking action against PIP.  
In any event, sub-standard PIP breast implants were distributed throughout the EU for a 
significant period of time. In 2009, the first concerns that the breast implants might be defective 
were raised in France.136 However, it was not until 2011 that the French public supervisory 
agency responsible for medical devices, AFSSAPS,137 issued a warning and that PIP breast 
implants were taken off the market. By that time, many thousands of women had already 
received PIP breast implants. They were faced with great uncertainty – there was no way for 
them to find out whether the breast implants that they had received were sub-standard. 
Sometimes it was not even possible for them to be sure whether or not their implants had been 
produced by PIP.138 Furthermore, a medical report that had been written at the request of the 
European Commission stated that although the PIP breast implants might have a higher risk of 
rupture, it could not be proved that there were any particular health risks associated with the 
higher risk of rupture (such as a higher risk of cancer).139 Faced with this uncertainty, many 
women decided to have their breast implants removed. In some situations, the removal of the 
breast implants was covered by their health insurance. However, most of the time, health 
insurers – whether public or private – refused to pay the removal costs if the original decision to 
have breast implants was based purely on aesthetic reasons and not on a medical indication.140 
Some cosmetic surgery clinics offered to remove the breast implants at cost price or even for 
free. However, they would still require women to pay for the costs of new breast implants. As a 
consequence, many women had to pay a significant amount of money as a result of having 
received – or possibly having received – defective breast implants. Moreover, there was a 
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possibility of psychological harm. For all of these reasons, it is understandable that women 
wanted to seek legal redress. 
To be able to understand the various litigation strategies that have been pursued after the PIP 
breast implants scandal, it is important to understand the regulatory framework in which the 
breast implants were marketed and distributed. The regulatory framework of the New Approach 
has been introduced in chapter 3. Breast implants are considered medical devices and, as such, 
come within the New Approach.141 The Medical Devices Directive142 lays down the essential 
requirements which breast implants have to fulfil,143 while the specific technical requirements 
have been laid down in a European standard adopted through CEN.144 Before medical devices 
can be placed on the market, the manufacturer must attach the CE marking to goods and issue a 
declaration of conformity, declaring that the goods comply with the provisions of the Directive – 
and, necessarily, of the European standard.145 A notified body then has to inspect the 
manufacturer’s quality system and design dossier.146 Each Member State has to notify to the 
European Commission which bodies can fulfil this role in their country – hence the term 
“notified body”. Once a notified body has approved the quality system and design dossier the 
product can be placed on the market. The notified body will then continue to undertake regular 
surveillance of the quality system.147 In the case of PIP, the notified body was TÜV Rheinland, a 
large German certification body. It is not necessary for a manufacturer to obtain the approval of 
a notified body in their own Member State – it is possible to choose a notified body in another 
Member State. The conformity assessment by the notified body focusses solely on the quality 
system and the design of the product. Therefore, there is no direct control of whether the 
medical devices actually comply with the specific provisions of the European standard. The 
assessment focusses exclusively on the quality system and the design dossier in place. In addition 
to the role of notified bodies, an important function is performed by national supervisory 
agencies, which are responsible for surveillance of the market.148  
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In a case like the PIP case, there are a number of parties a case could be brought against to claim 
damages. The most probable defendant would be the PIP factory or its management. However, 
rather unsurprisingly, the PIP factory had gone into liquidation in 2010. Furthermore, the 
owners of the factory did not have any traceable assets and criminal proceedings were brought 
against the management of the factory before the Tribunal de Grand Instance in Marseille. In 
December 2013, the main owner of the factory, Jean Claude Mas, was sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment.149 Therefore, bringing a case against the management also had little chance of 
success. Many victims joined the criminal proceedings as victims, which meant that they were 
able to claim compensation from a criminal compensation scheme developed by the French 
State.150 Although compensation by this scheme is limited to 3000 euros, it meant that the 
victims would obtain at least some redress.  
In light of the difficulties in suing PIP or its management, different litigation strategies have been 
pursued in various Member States. The Austrian consumer organisation VKI has brought 
proceedings against Allianz, a German insurer with which PIP had obtained insurance.151 As the 
insurance contract was concluded with the French subsidiary of Allianz, the proceedings have 
been brought in Paris by a French lawyer who is instructed by VKI. The claim has been brought 
on behalf of around 70 Austrian victims. A number of legal issues have to be decided first by the 
French court.152 First of all, it is uncertain whether a valid insurance contract has been concluded 
between Allianz and PIP. Allianz submits they it has been deceived by PIP as to the nature of 
the product and the production process.153 As a consequence, the insurance contract would be 
void. Secondly, Allianz claims that there is a clause in the contract which excludes residents 
outside France from the scope of the insurance contract. This would mean that the damage 
incurred by the Austrian victims would not be covered by the insurance contract.154 The Paris 
court still has to decide these preliminary issues. In a separate judgment in 2012, the Tribunal de 
Commerce in Toulon held that the deceit by PIP did not invalidate the insurance contract 
between Allianz and PIP and that there was a valid insurance contract in place. However, it is 
clear that the case against Allianz remains complicated. An alternative strategy has been to sue 
TÜV Rheinland, the German certification company. A group of victims have brought 
proceedings against TÜV for its alleged failure to carry out the required surveillance and 
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inspections at the PIP factory. The case has been brought in tort – it is claimed that TÜV has 
breached the duty of care which it owed to the women who received PIP breast implants. In the 
UK, claimants have started group litigation against a number of clinics and individual surgeons 
who had provided PIP breast implants to them. The litigation is based on the contract between 
the patients and the clinics in which they received the breast implants. It is claimed that the 
breast implants were not of satisfactory quality. Overall, different strategies have been pursued in 
various Member States. These strategies will be analysed in chapter 6. 
IV. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPEAN 
STANDARDISATION AND HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
 
A. Traditional evidence-based medical standardisation and European 
standardisation through CEN 
 
Medicine and standardisation is not a natural combination. Medical doctors are one of the 
traditional professions.155 As a result, there is a very strong emphasis on the autonomy and 
integrity of the profession. Medical knowledge is made, maintained and developed within the 
medical profession, which has created its own structures to communicate and protect this 
knowledge.156 External interference with these structures of knowledge is deemed to be an attack 
on the integrity of the profession. In addition, doctors place strong reliance on the individual 
nature of the relationship between doctor and patient. They have sworn the Hippocratic Oath, 
which means they must always act in the best interests of the individual patient. This is one of 
the founding pillars of medical practice. The primary “standard” among medical doctors is that 
the interests of the individual patient should always prevail over existing standards or guidelines. 
These two principles – professional autonomy and individualism – could appear to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with any kind of attempt to standardise medical practice. At the same 
time, doctors also recognise that it is in the interests of patients to share medical knowledge and 
to create medical standards with guidelines on best practice.157 However, these standardisation 
activities are a special kind of standardisation and are based on two fundamental pillars.158 Firstly, 
the development of medical standards should be in the exclusive control of the medical 
profession itself. The creation of medical standards is an evidence-based medical science for 
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which only the medical profession has the necessary knowledge and experience. The inclusion of 
other, non-medical interests in the setting of medical standards would not be in the best interests 
of patients and would not result in the provision of optimum medical care.159 Secondly, the 
standards developed by the medical profession should not obtain strict binding force. This is 
because they are always inferior to the primary standard among doctors – that the individual 
patient should be treated as an individual case and in their best interests. A doctor must always 
be able to reject a standard and to depart from a standard in the best interests of the individual 
patient.160 The medical profession has developed a principle for this: the “comply or explain” 
principle. In principle, doctors expected to comply with existing medical standards. There is a 
presumption of compliance. At the same time, it must always be possible for doctors to refuse to 
follow a particular standard in an individual case. However, there is a professional burden on the 
doctor to explain why the standard was not followed in the circumstances of the case.161 
In the Cleft Lip Surgery example, the key problem is that there are many medical standards that 
deal with aspects of the treatment of babies born with cleft lips. There are both international, 
European and national standards for cleft lip treatment. This is the direct result of the fact that 
there is very little consensus about how babies with cleft lips should be treated. In Member 
States with less medical expertise, such as in Eastern Europe, this could lead to uncertainty about 
which guidelines should be applied and a preference for minimum standards that would reduce 
costs. Therefore, the European standardisation process through CEN is used as a facilitator to 
bring some order in the existing medical standards and to assist the new Member States with 
adopting a coherent and good quality guideline. CEN could help to provide substance to the 
concept of international scientific evidence developed by the CJEU.162 However, at the same 
time, the process has shown that if there is insufficient agreement about the status of 
international science, it is unlikely that European standardisation will be successful. Although 
Bulgaria and Romania would benefit from more international input in medical standardisation, 
there are insufficient incentives for medical professionals in other Member States to export their 
international science to the new Member States. Furthermore, they do not believe that European 
standardisation through CEN would be the right way to do this, since the standardisation 
process through CEN does not have sufficient safeguards to guarantee that the standards which 
are produced are evidence-based.  
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The situation is different for Aesthetic Surgery Services. The problem there is that aesthetic 
surgery has emerged as a new field of medicine. Practitioners in this new sector do not feel 
bound by existing medical standards, because they do not cover their new specialty. The medical 
professional associations deny that there is a lacuna because they do not consider aesthetic 
surgery as a separate specialty – the sector is already sufficiently covered by medical standards for 
plastic surgery, ENT surgery and dermatology. From that perspective, European standardisation 
through CEN would be unnecessary and a threat to existing medical standards. At the same 
time, those in favour of the standardisation process argue that market forces have resulted in 
dangerous practices in the aesthetic surgery sector and that, with the traditional medical 
standardisation routes being blocked by the professional associations, European standardisation 
through CEN has become the only realistic alternative to impose some regulation on a sector 
which has de facto become self-standing. 
With respect to methodology, most Member States or associations of medical professionals have 
developed methods to ensure that any medical standards are based on sound medical evidence.163 
This methodology has been adopted from institutes in the United States, which were 
frontrunners in the field of evidence-based medicine. 164  The medical standardisation process 
starts with a thorough search of the available medical literature on the topic of the 
standardisation. After this search, the participants in the standardisation process have to make a 
qualitative analysis of the literature. They have to decide, on the basis of their professional 
judgment, which studies are relevant and which studies are not relevant, and they have to decide 
which studies provide sufficient medical and scientific basis to serve as inspiration for the 
standardisation process.165 It is expected that throughout the standard references are made to the 
relevant literature. Furthermore, the standard has to explain how the literature supports the 
guidance, or why a particular study or strand of the literature has not been followed in the 
standard.166 All of this means that scientific evidence plays a key role in medical standardisation. 
The parties that are involved in medical standardisation still need to reach consensus on the basis 
of the literature. They are also expected to use their professional judgment to decide on the 
weight of the literature. However, in the end, the consensus has to be based on scientific 
evidence. No such requirements exist for European standardisation through CEN. Although 
medical literature will play a role in the process, the process is inherently less scientific. The 
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safeguards that exist in traditional medical standardisation do not exist in European 
standardisation.  
 
This is readily acknowledged by participants in European standardisation processes in the 
healthcare sector – the evidence-based nature of the European standard for Aesthetic Surgery 
Services is rather slim.167 Their response to any criticism is that European standardisation 
through CEN is a different kind of medical standardisation that does not focus on the medical 
procedure, but more on the entire process of the doctor-patient relationship.168 The standards 
would not be about how the doctor should treat the patient, but more about the entire 
relationship between patient and doctor. This relationship involves many issues which are not 
scientific and which do not have to be evidence-based. The question what information should be 
provided to patients and what facilities should be offered to patients does not (always) have to be 
evidence-based. Such European standards would then be supplementary, or additional, to 
evidence-based medical standards. However, the medical profession claims that it is never 
entirely possible to distinguish between procedure and process. Furthermore, such process-based 
standards have a direct impact on the medical procedure. There is a real risk that European 
standardisation could be used to circumvent traditional medical standardisation and to impose 
standards which could not realistically be made through traditional medical standardisation.169 
This is confirmed by some other recent European standardisation initiatives in the healthcare 
sector. The chiropractors were the first profession to make a healthcare services standard 
through CEN and the osteopaths quickly followed in their footsteps.170 For these professions, 
European standardisation constitutes an attractive mechanism to provide a sense of professional 
legitimacy to healthcare services that are not evidence-based.171 While this should not be a direct 
problem for the medical profession, it becomes more of a problem when the medical profession 
itself directly engages in European standardisation, such as in the Aesthetic Surgery Services 
project. 
 
Another element of traditional medical standardisation that cannot easily be accommodated in 
the European standardisation process is authorisation. For evidence-based medical standards, 
authorisation, or verification, by the appropriate medical associations is a key requirement to the 
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standard obtaining a status as the relevant professional standard.172 This is both from the 
professional as well as from the legal point of view.173 The standard must have been accepted by 
the profession as the appropriate standard before it comes into force in the sector. There is no 
such requirement for European standardisation. In fact, in the examples discussed above, the 
interaction between the European standardisation and the relevant medical associations was 
extremely tense. It is highly unlikely that authorisation would take place after the strong 
objections from within the medical profession. Therefore, it is less likely that the European 
standard will be applied in the regulation of healthcare services at the national level. 
 
B. European standardisation and de-professionalisation of the medical 
profession 
 
Closely linked to the discussion of the non-evidence-based nature of European standardisation is 
the argument that European standardisation would lead to de-professionalisation of the medical 
profession. This has become evident in the standardisation process for Aesthetic Surgery 
Services. There is a real fear among the medical profession that European standardisation would 
be used as a tool for anti-competitive protectionism. This is particularly caused by the fact that 
aesthetic surgery services are provided in a market. Such protectionism would reduce medicine 
to all other services that are exposed to market forces. It would place medicine on the same level 
as those services regulated by the Services Directive 2006.174 However, for parties like UEMS and 
CPME, this is no justification to allow aesthetic surgery to escape the traditional methods of 
medical standardisation. This is because treatments will still be provided by medical doctors who 
should be bound by professional and ethical obligations.175 Professionalisation requires that 
doctors operating on a market should not abandon their professional hat and simply change it 
for a business hat. The fact that reatments might be subject to market forces is not sufficient to 
allow them to use European standardisation.  
The nature of the European standardisation process facilitates de-professionalisation – not only 
because of the lack of scientific evidence, but also because all interested parties can freely 
participate. This has resulted in a difficult paradox in the European standardisation process for 
Aesthetic Surgery Services. The process has been started to regulate the competence of medical 
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professionals on the market and to increase transparency in a market where many providers with 
different qualifications are operating. The Chairman of the Dutch mirror committee for 
Aesthetic Surgery Services described this situation as a market with “good guys and bad guys”.176 
Traditional medical standardisation has been unable to deal with this situation.177 As a 
consequence, it is legitimate to escape these structures of medical standardisation to attempt to 
find a solution through external mechanisms such as CEN. This has to be done in order to 
protect the integrity of the medical profession itself. In order to do this, they have to surrender 
part of their professionalisation by sitting around the table with practitioners who are acting as 
pure market players and who are also able to participate in the European standardisation process. 
Sometimes these practitioners are not even medical professionals – they often do not have the 
necessary qualifications to do what they are doing and they do not feel bound by professional or 
ethical obligations. In order to reach agreement with these practitioners, the more traditional 
medical professionals have to abandon some of their own professionalisation. At the same time, 
the dialogue with the market players is used to attempt to impose a process of 
professionalisation on them. That could again be considered as an ultimate indication of 
professionalism. It would mean that “the bad guys” would no longer be able to perform certain 
treatments, or at least that the standard would reject the possibility of these treatments being 
performed by them. This professional starting point will always result in a compromise, but at 
least the underlying intention has been to approach professionalisation as closely as possible. 
C. The role of public authorities and the protection of national legislation in 
European standardisation 
 
Another important aspect of European standardisation in the healthcare sector is to what extent 
public authorities play a role in it, and to what extent European standardisation is regarded as a 
threat to national regulatory frameworks for medical standardisation, which are under strict 
public control in a number of Member States. It has already been noted that these national 
regulatory frameworks are starting to open up to the market, which also means that European 
standardisation through CEN could become a more realistic possibility. Public authorities have 
to respond to this. The role of public authorities in the standardisation process for Aesthetic 
Surgery Services is important. In particular, the French position was very much based on the 
protection of national legislation.178 The position of national public authorities was even more 
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obvious in the Cleft Lip Surgery process. Here, the French Ministry of Health directly intervened 
to object to the standardisation process.179 This position has been made more explicit in some of 
the comments that were made when the national standardisation organisations voted on the 
proposal for a Cleft Lip Surgery standard. In particular, the French position should be noted: 
 
“Such a topic is considered as a very sensitive one linked to the patient safety. This is why in France the 
management of cleft lip and palate falls within the remit of the public authorities in charge of the health system, 
organised by dedicated regulations. Moreover, the production of recommendations for good practices that contribute 
to the continuous improvement of quality and safety of care is in the competence of an administrative and 
independent scientific authority (the Haute Autorité de Santé)”180 
 
This comment illustrates a “competence justification” used by Member States to refuse to 
engage with European standardisation. There is no engagement with the substantive provisions 
of the proposed European standard. The simple existence of national regulatory competence is 
sufficient to reject the possibility of European standardisation. In this particular example, the 
invoked clash is also framed as a clash between private regulation and public legislation. In that 
respect, it is important that France has in a way “publicised” traditional medical standardisation 
by creating an authority and a public regulatory framework through which medical standards are 
made.  
In France, the Haute Autorité de Santé (“HAS”) is responsible for the supervision of the quality 
of healthcare services.181 Although it is not strictly speaking a Government body, it is a public 
body on which the French State exercises significant influence. The French State appoints 
delegates to the Board of HAS. The majority of the budget of HAS comes from licence fees for 
the advertising of medication, grants from health insurers and from the French State. HAS is 
responsible for the supervision and certification of hospitals, individual doctors and for the 
development of scientific healthcare standards. These standards are developed within the 
organisational structure of HAS. The initiative for a standard can be taken by the Ministry of 
Health, scientific organisations or HAS itself. HAS can decide to outsource the making of a 
particular standard, but it will always remain fully responsible for the final instrument. Medical 
doctors are brought within the organisation to work in committees within HAS to develop 
standards. They will usually be joined by public officials and health economists. As a result, it can 
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reasonably be concluded that the medical profession has surrendered at least some of its 
autonomy. At the same time, it should be noted that the medical profession has never been 
completely autonomous vis-à-vis the State and that the medical aspects of the standardisation 
process are likely to remain within the exclusive control of the medical profession. 
The French comments provide evidence that the French State is able to impose its views on 
AFNOR, the French standardisation organisation. In an indirect way, this has an impact at the 
European level. It shows that an initiative for European regulation of a private nature does not 
take away the competence of the State to control regulation in the healthcare sector. If the 
cooperation between public and private parties in medical standardisation at the national level is 
hierarchical, this hierarchy will effectively be transplanted to the European level. This might be 
specific for the regulation of healthcare services, for which the State is still assuming the main 
responsibility at the national level. However, the French and Spanish reactions clearly show that 
if the regulation of a particular service is still vertically, or hierarchically, controlled by the State at 
the national level, this position can also be enforced at the European level. Essentially, what this 
means is that the CEN standardisation process is not sufficiently transnational to take matters 
out of the control of the State. The State is able to “infiltrate” in the standardisation process and 
protect the hierarchical nature of national regulation. This is not the same for all Member States. 
For example, in the UK and in the Netherlands, the State, public bodies or agencies do not have 
the same influence on the national standardisation organisations.182 
 
D. European healthcare standards vis-à-vis national healthcare standards  
 
Finally, a common objection to European standardisation in the healthcare sector is the 
argument that European standards would be unnecessary or undesirable because there are 
already sufficient and adequate national standards. With the Cleft Lip Surgery proposal, some 
Member States took the position that there was no need for a European standard, since they 
already had national standards that were perfectly capable of guaranteeing good quality 
healthcare.183 The creation of European standards would be a risk to these national standards, as 
it could result in the lowest common denominator. If there are Member States which feel a need 
for higher medical standards, these Member States would be happy to share their national 
standards with them. This position has been taken by Germany and the Netherlands.  
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The comments of the Netherlands were very clear: 
“European standardization of healthcare services across Europe is unrealistic. Healthcare services for cleft lip and 
or palate in the Netherlands is aiming for optimal healthcare. Optimal healthcare might not be realistic 
(financially) for all individual countries. European standardization would most likely aim for an average level of 
healthcare. It is not of the interest of the Netherlands neither to develop nor to contribute to such a standard”184 
 
This statement clearly expresses the fear that European standards would result in a lowering of 
national standards. A response to this objection could be that a European minimum standard 
would not mean that a higher national standard could no longer be used. The European standard 
would only provide the required minimum level of care. However, it would then be useless for 
Dutch stakeholders to participate and to contribute financially to the standardisation process. 
Moreover, the objection was based on a fear that public authorities, or health insurers, would use 
European standards to make them legally binding in their contact with healthcare providers.185 A 
lower European standard would mean a reduction in costs. The use of European standards 
would then result in a lower level of care than the level of care provided on the basis of national 
standards. This would not be in the best interests of patients. An additional complication is that 
in many Member States there are not even national medical standards for certain treatments. For 
example, although the Netherlands has managed to adopt a national standard for certain aspects 
of cleft care, most care is still provided on the basis of regional protocols.186 Europeanisation of 
such standards would be in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity in healthcare and would 
threaten the individual or local nature of healthcare provision.   
 
V. A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION  
 
The first section of this chapter showed that the European regulatory framework for healthcare 
services provides scope for European standardisation. In particular, the emphasis on information 
requirements in the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive means that European standardisation 
could regulate aspects of the doctor-patient relationship at the national level. However, this 
European regulatory framework does not necessarily match with national regulatory frameworks. 
It defers to national standards for medical treatment. With the various national differences in 
how these standards are made, it is unlikely that a European standard would play a uniform role 
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in the regulation of healthcare services at the national level. This is primarily because the extent 
to which private regulation is allowed to play a role in the regulation of healthcare services is 
widely divergent across the EU. This is not something European standardisation could 
necessarily have an impact on. On the contrary, national cultures of standardisation could act as 
obstacles to European standardisation. This would be purely on the level of the standard-
making, and not necessarily on the level of their application. It would not necessarily mean that 
European healthcare standards would not be applied in private law. However, the public law 
dominance in the making of healthcare standards is also likely to have a negative impact on the 
use of the standards in private law, because it limits their scope of application. Finally, the fact 
that there is limited scope for private regulation of healthcare services at the national level will 
result in very few private European standards being adopted. This is because Member States are 
likely to defend and reinforce their public dominance in medical standardisation at the European 
level. 
 
Overall, two main problems with European standardisation of healthcare services can be 
identified. First of all, the European standardisation process is incompatible with evidence-based 
medical standardisation. Although it might be possible to incorporate elements of evidence-
based standardisation in the process, the standardisation process through CEN is significantly 
more political than traditional medical standardisation. Decisions are taken on the basis of 
consensus among the various European participants. There is no guarantee in the process that 
this consensus reflects medical scientific evidence. Participants in European standardisation 
would argue that they are working on a different, and additional, type of healthcare standards. 
However, this argument is not accepted by a majority of the medical profession. Moreover, there 
is a fear that European standardisation is used by outsiders – or even medical professionals 
themselves – as a justification to cut on funding, or as a tool to protect and restrict the market 
for certain treatments. In addition, European standardisation could become an escape route to 
doctors or to pseudo-medical professions to provide a sense of public legitimacy to what they 
are doing. Whether or not this strong criticism of European standardisation by the medical 
profession is justified does not really matter. What matters is that it is a genuine concern which 
means that the medical profession is strongly opposed to European standardisation. Without the 
support of the medical profession and the various European medical associations, it is unlikely 
that European standardisation will become more prominent in the healthcare sector. 
 
Secondly, European standardisation faces strong opposition from public authorities in the 
Member States. This is particularly true for those Member States in which public authorities are 
in strict control of medical standardisation. This hierarchical relationship between public and 
private regulation is subsequently protected at the European level. The result is that these 
Member States are likely to vote against European standardisation projects in the healthcare 
sector. Moreover, if a project is started, they will send representatives of the public authorities 
whose primary purpose is to protect national legislation. As a result, the participation of these 
Member States is not constructive. Moreover, there is a serious concern in the old Member 
States that any standards which are adopted through European standardisation will be lower than 
existing national standards. This is again a reason to refuse to engage with European 
standardisation of healthcare services. Although the European standard would not obtain 
binding force after its adoption, it would be useless for Member States and for stakeholders to 
participate in the creation of a standard that would be lower than their existing standard. The 
Cleft Lip Surgery proposal shows that European standardisation is not accepted as a tool for 
development aid for the new Member States. One of the reasons is that the funding of European 
standardisation has to come from the stakeholders themselves. 
 
In conclusion, there are a number of serious obstacles to European standardisation of healthcare 
services. They are also reflected in today’s reality – very few standards have been adopted, those 
standards that are in the process of being made face strong opposition both at the national and 
at the European level, and there are no indications that European standardisation is likely to 
become more prominent in the healthcare sector in the future. On that basis, it can be concluded 
that European standardisation of healthcare services remains both controversial and marginal. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
